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Note
Why Not Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt?
Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades,' the area of family law has become in-
creasingly infused with federal constitutional principles.2 Prior to
that time, two factors-the fact that "family rights"3 are not explic-
itly mentioned in the Constitution 4 and the tenth amendment's re-
siduary power clause 5 -combined to leave the area of family law
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the states 6 with constitutional
1. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court held that a
state statute outlawing the use and distribution of contraceptives was uncon-
stitutional. Griswold was the first case in which the Court articulated the
concept of a zone of privacy arising from the penumbras of the first, third,
fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. Rights falling within this zone were
held to merit the protection of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Many commentators have viewed Griswold as the starting
point of the Supreme Court's application of constitutional principles to this
area of law. See infra note 2.
2. For an excellent analysis of the status of the family under the Constitution,
see Development in the Law--The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 1156 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. See also H. KRAUSE,
FAMY LAw IN A NUTSHELL (1977).
3. For simplicity's sake, the phrase "family rights" will be used as a generic
term for individual rights relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
abortion, family relationships, and the rearing and education of children. See
infra note 14.
4. Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486, is instructive on
this point. Goldberg sought to base the Court's decision on the ninth amend-
ment which reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. IX_ Goldberg pointed out that this amendment was
passed to placate those concerned that a "Bill of Rights" would leave the im-
pression that unenumerated rights had no status under the Constitution.
Thus, although family rights are not mentioned elsewhere, they should fall
under the ninth amendment according to Goldberg.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The tenth amendment provides: 'The powers not del-
egated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the State's respectively, or to the people." Id.
6. For examples of this analysis, see the dissent in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
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protections thought to be inappropriate,7 if not inapplicable. 8 To-
day, the clear trend has been in the direction of an increasing rec-
ognition and protection of family rights under the Constitution.
This protection has taken two distinct, but at times related,9
forms: equal protectionO and due process." The present analysis
will focus solely on the second branch of these constitutional pro-
tections. Following the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecti-
CUt,1 2 in which the Court held that the fourteenth amendment's
U.S. 371, 389 (1971), as well as Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), and
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966). It is important to note that the
dissent in Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting), seeks to revive this type of analysis.
7. "Both theory and the precedents of this Court teach us solicitude for state
interests, particularly in the field of family and family property arrange-
ments." United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966).
8. 'The power of the States over marriage and divorce is complete except as
limited by specific constitutional provisions." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 389-90 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
9. For an example of a case involving both an equal protection and due process
analysis, see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). This case involved a
state statute requiring an applicant for marriage to submit a statement that
his or her children were being adequately supported. See also Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
10. No state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the law." U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1. Briefly, the Supreme Court has
developed a three-tier analysis under this amendment. The highest level of
scrutiny, strict scrutiny, is applied to suspect classifications and fundamental
rights. A middle level of scrutiny is applied to semi-suspect classifications
such as sex. The lowest level of scrutiny, rational basis, is used in the re-
mainder of cases.
For examples of this doctrine application to matters of family law, see
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978); and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
11. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold may be seen as the crystallization or culmina-
tion of the Supreme Court's earlier attempts to articulate a fundamental in-
terest in family relationships. See supra note 1. The trend which resulted in
Griswold is often traced back to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Meyer involved a school
teacher who had been convicted under a state statute prohibiting the teach-
ing of any foreign language to children younger than the eighth grade. In
dicta, the Court recognized the right of an individual "to marry, establish a
home and bring up children. .. ," Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399, among other rights.
Pierce involved an Oregon statute making attendance at public schools
mandatory. The Pierce Court held that the statute was unconstitutional be-
cause it intruded on the liberty of parents to make decisions regarding the
raising and educating of their children. Commentators have also pointed to
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a case involving a woman's decision whether
or not to have an abortion, as a continuation of the Court's recognition of the
fundamental nature of family life.
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due process clause was applicable to the fundamental interest of
marital privacy,13 the due process doctrine has been extended to a
number of important, related rights,14 including the right of par-
ents to rear their children.' 5 The fundamental nature of parental
rights was recently reaffirmed in Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services16 when the Court wrote:
This Court's decisions have by now made plain beyond the need for
multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right to "the companion-
ship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an impor-
tant interest that "undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection."
17
After having thrown the cloak of due process around this
sphere of family rights, the Supreme Court has been confronted
with a host of decisions' 8 asking it to define the parameters of what
process is constitutionally due.19 In Lassiter,20 the Court applied
the three factor balancing test 2' laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge22
13. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. Among the rights recognized as fundamental are: (1) the right of individual
autonomy in activities relating to marriage, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978); (2) procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); (3) contra-
ception, Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); (4) abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
(5) family relationships, Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977);
and (6) the rearing and education of children, Pierce v. Society of the Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See also Develop-
ments, supra note 2, at 1161.
15. For example, in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Court struck down
a state statute mandating that upon the death of their mother, children of
unwed fathers become wards of the state. The Court said: 'The private inter-
est here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably
warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protec-
tion." Id. at 651.
16. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). This case presented the question of whether the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment required that indigent parents be
afforded counsel.
17. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (citation omitted).
18. See supra note 14.
19. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). In Morrissey, the Court
held that under the due process clause a parolee at parole revocation hear-
ings is entitled to a hearing, written notice, and an opportunity to present
evidence and cross-examine witnesses. This case is usually cited for the
proposition that "[o] nce it is determined that due process applies, the ques-
tion remains what process is due." Id. at 481.
20. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). "In Lassiter, the Court and three dissenters agreed that
the nature of the process due in parental rights termination proceedings
turns on a balancing of the 'three distinct factors' specified in Mathews v.
Eldridge [424 U.S. 319 (1976)] .... " Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394
(1982).
21. These three factors include: (1) the private interest affected by the official
action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's inter-
[Vol. 62:602
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to define what process is constitutionally due in the area of family
rights. Santosky v. Kramer,23 a case in which the Court was asked
to determine what standard of proof is constitutionally mandated
in a termination of parental rights proceeding, presented the Court
with another opportunity to apply the Mathews analysis in a mat-
ter of family law.
This Note will analyze the Santosky decision, giving particular
emphasis to its reconcilability with Lassiter. Additionally, an anal-
ysis of whether the Supreme Court went far enough in establish-
ing the standard of proof will be undertaken.
I. THE SANTOSKY DECISION
A. The Facts
The Santosky decision marked the culmination of nearly a dec-
ade of litigation between John and Annie Santosky24 and the State
of New York.25 The first contact between the Santoskys and the
New York Family Court came in November 1973. After some evi-
dence of parental neglect and abuse,26 Kramer, Commissioner of
the Ulster County Department of Social Services, initiated tempo-
rary removal proceedings 27 in the New York Family Court and suc-
ceeded in having Tina, the Santoskys' eldest daughter, removed.
Ten months later, on the basis of similar evidence, John III was
also temporarily removed.28 Three days later, when the Santos-
kys' third child, Jed, was only three days old, he was also re-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burden
that additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976).
22. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews held that due process did not require that prior
to termination of Social Security disability benefit payments, a recipient be
afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.
23. 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982). It should be noted that the Supreme Court was given
an opportunity to decide the standard of proof question, among others, in Doe
v. Delaware, 450 U.S. 382 (1981), but dismissed that case on jurisdictional
grounds, namely that the case lacked a properly presented federal question.
24. The Santoskys have five children: Tina, John II, Jed, James, and Jeremy.
Only three of these children are involved in the present litigation. The State
of New York has not initiated temporary removal or permanent neglect pro-
ceedings for the other two children. The Court notes that respondent Kramer
does not allege that the Santoskys are unfit to handle these younger children.
Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1393 n.5.
25. The department specifically sued was the Ulster County Department of So-
cial Services. Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1393. See also id. at 13391-92 for a sum-
mary of relevant New York statutory law.
26. Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1408 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court noted,
that the temporary removal proceedings for Tina were initiated on the basis
of complaints by neighbors and hospital reports of injuries to the child.
27. N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 1022 (McKinney 1975).
28. See Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1408 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). John III was
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moved.29 Temporary removal of these children was continued
pursuant to an evidentiary hearing in December 1975.30
Nearly one year later, in September 1976, Kramer initiated per-
manent neglect proceedings for the three children 3l but was un-
successful.32 In October 1978, Kramer again petitioned the Family
Court for permanent termination of the Santosky's parental
rights 33 and was successful. At the factfinding stage in this latter
proceeding, the court applied the statutory standards and found
that the Santoskys had failed to plan for the future of their chil-
dren, that this failure had risen to the level of permanent neglect,
and that the state had made diligent but unsuccessful efforts to
reunite the family. The presiding Family Court judge rejected the
Santoskys' constitutional challenge to the "fair preponderance"
standard of proof and proceeded to decide the case upon that stan-
dard. At the dispositional hearing in April 1979, the same judge
determined that the best interests of the three Santosky children
would be served by the permanent termination of their natural
parents' rights.
In 1980, the Santoskys sought review of the Family Court deci-
sion in the New York Court of Appeals again challenging the con-
stitutionality of the "fair preponderance" standard. That court sua
sponte34 transferred the case to the New York Supreme Court, Ap-
pellate Division,35 which affirmed the Family Court, holding that
temporarily removed when he was admitted to the hospital for malnutrition
and injuries.
29. See id. In the case of Jed, Kramer apparently used the exigent circumstances
exception to the temporary removal statute. Thus, based on the abusive
treatment of the other two children, Jed was removed.
30. After this evidentiary proceeding, the Family Court issued a written opinion
indicating the reason for its decision, namely that the Santoskys could not
resume their parental duties because of personality defects. The court di-
rected Kramer and his Department to provide a written plan for the Santos-
kys in their attempts to reunite the family.
31. In re Santosky, 89 Misc. 2d 730, 393 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1977). The court dismissed
Kramer's petition for failure to prove an essential statutory element. The
case was affirmed on appeal in In re John W., 63 A.D.2d 750, 404 N.Y.S.2d 717
(1978), where the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court found
that the Santoskys had planned for the future of their children.
32. The plan proposed by Kramer included both intensive counseling and train-
ing services for the Santoskys. The 1976 petition was the result of the Santos-
kys' failure to avail themselves fully of these services and of a growing
concern over the children's lengthy stay in foster homes.
33. As the majority noted, parents are not afforded double jeopardy protection.
Thus, the state may continue to initiate permanent neglect proceedings until
successful.
34. The Court had transferred the case because it felt that a direct appeal was
not available since questions other than the constitutional validity of a stat-
ute were involved.
35. In re John AA, 75 A.D.2d 910, 427 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1980).
[Vol. 62:602
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New York's standard was proper and constitutional.36 The New
York Court of Appeals then dismissed the case for lack of a sub-
stantial constitutional question. In 1981, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.3 7
B. The Supreme Court Decision
In Santosky v. Kramer, the United States Supreme Court held
in a 5-to-4 decision that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment required that a state use a clear and convincing stan-
dard of proof in a termination of parental rights proceeding.38
The Court quickly disposed of the threshold question of
whether due process applied to cases involving the termination of
parental rights, stating: "[F] reedom of personal choice in matters
of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment." 39 Thus, procedures to terminate paren-
tal rights must meet the standards of the due process clause.40 The
Court was then confronted with the corollary question of what pro-
cess was due4 ' and employed the Mathews factors 42 to make this
determination. The Santosky majority and dissent did not differ
on the threshold question, that is, whether due process applied,
but only on the results of an application of Mathews to determine
what process was in fact due.43
Relying on Addington v. Texas,44 the Court reaffirmed its views
on the function of a standard of proof, namely that the standard is
to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our
society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclu-
36. Id. The Court reasoned that the "fair preponderance" standard balances the
child's rights with those of the parents.
37. Santosky v. Kramer, 450 U.S. 993 (1981).
38. 102 S. Ct. at 1402.
39. 102 S. Ct. at 1394.
40. The Supreme Court had been confronted with that exact question most re-
cently in Lassiter and there held that it is "not disputed that state interven-
tion to terminate the relationship between [a parent] and [the] child must be
accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process
Clause." Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1394 (citation omitted). Also, the Court
pointed out that the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in their
children "does not evaporate simply because they have not been model par-
ents or have lost temporary custody of their children .... When the State
moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with
fundamentally fair procedures." Id. at 1394.
41. See supra note 19.
42. See supra note 21.
43. "It is the majority's answer to this question [what process is due] with which
I disagree." Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1405 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
44. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). Addington involved the standard of proof in civil commit-
ment cases. Using a due process analysis, the Court held that a clear and
convincing standard of proof was constitutionally necessary.
1983]
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sions for a particular type of adjudication," 45 and it also represents
a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distrib-
uted among the parties. Additionally, the Court emphasized that
this was a question of federal law,46 and the type of question tradi-
tionally decided by the judiciary. 47
The Santosky Court began examining the first Mathews factor,
namely the private interest affected, by making two key points.
First, the Court quoted from Goldberg v. Kelly,4 8 stressing that the
extent of due process protection is governed by the extent of an
individual's potential grievous loss.49 The question of whether a
loss is sufficiently grievous to require more than average certainty
by the factfinder turns on both the nature of the private interest
affected and the permanency of the loss.5 0 In the present case, the
Court reaffirmed its position that parents have a substantial inter-
est in their children.5 1 Additionally, the Court emphasized the per-
manency of this loss in two ways: "When the State initiates a
parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to in-
fringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it."52 The
Court also stated that unlike juvenile delinquency, civil commit-
ment, deportation, and denaturalization cases, the termination of
parental rights is irreversible. 53
Second, the Court distinguished between the factfinding and
dispositional phases of New York's procedure.5 4 It emphasized
that at the former, the interests of parent and child are identical; in
particular, they share a "vital interest in preventing the erroneous
45. Id. at 423 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
Winship held that a beyond a reasonable doubt standard was constitution-
ally necessary in both adult criminal cases and juvenile delinquency
proceedings.
46. Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1395. Perhaps in an attempt to rebut the dissent's ar-
gument of state supremacy in this area, the Santosky Court quoted from
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) by stating: "The 'minimum require-
ments [of procedural due process] being a matter of federal law, they are not
diminished by the fact that the state may have specified its own procedures
that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse offi-
cial action.'" Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1395.
47. Id. But see 102 S. Ct. at 1404 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg involved a plaintiff whose welfare benefits were
terminated without a prior evidentiary hearing. The Court held that the
plaintiff had a due process right to such a hearing.
49. Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1397.
50. Id.
51. See supra note 15.
52. Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1397.
53. Id. The Court went on to state: "Few forms of state action are both so severe
and so irreversible." Id.
54. See supra note 25.
[Vol. 62:602
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termination of their natural relationship."S5 Thus, interests of the
parent and child are not to be balanced against each other.5 6
Rather, this factfinding proceeding pits the State against the par-
ent.57 It is at this point that the dissent diverged from the majority
opinion. The dissent viewed the interests of the parent and child
as distinct.58 Thus, the dissent believed it necessary to balance the
interests of parent and child, and then balance the parent's inter-
est against the interests of the child and the state.59
The Court considered two questions in its analysis of the sec-
ond Mathews factor: the risk of erroneous deprivation of private
interests resulting from the "fair preponderance" standard and the
likelihood that a higher standard would reduce that risk.60
The Court noted that the "fair preponderance" standard did not
fairly allocate the risk of an erroneous factfinding between the
state and the parents. The Court stressed that the factfinding
stage of termination proceedings bears many of the indicia of a
criminal trial.61 Additionally, a variety of policy considerations 62
55. Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1398.
56. "The factfinding does not purport-and is not intended-to balance the
child's interest in a normal family home against the parents' interest in rais-
ing the child." Id. at 1397.
57. Id. at 1398. The Court also discussed the "rights" of foster parents but sug-
gested that these rights are not implicated at the factfinding stage. The foster
parents may become involved if they initiate permanent neglect proceedings
at the dispositional phase. The Court mentioned Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), a case involving the preremoval proce-
dures used in removing children from New York foster families. There, the
Court suggested that foster parents have an attenuated liberty interest in
their children at best.
58. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
This reasoning [by the majority] misses the mark. The child has
an interest in the outcome of the factfinding hearing independent of
that of the parent. To be sure, "the child and his parents share a vital
interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relation-
ship." Ante, at 1398 (emphasis added). But the child's interest in a
continuation of the family unit exists only to the extent that such a
continuation would not be harmful to him.
Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1412 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. "[I]n the context of a permanent neglect termination proceeding, the inter-
ests of the child and the State in a stable, nurturing homelife are balanced
against the interests of the parents in the rearing of their children ... ." Id.
at 1413. This was also the position of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division. See supra note 36.
60. 102 S. Ct. at 1398.
61. Id. In particular, the parent is "charged" with permanent neglect and served
with a summons. Also, the formal rules of evidence apply at the factfinding
stage, the parents are represented by counsel, and witnesses are called and
are subject to cross-examination. Finally, the judge must evaluate whether
the statutory standards have been met.
62. The Court referred to three sets of factors which "combine to magnify the
risk of erroneous factfinding." 102 S. Ct. at 1399. The first factor concerns the
1983]
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combined with this standard to create a substantial risk of errone-
ous termination.63
In regard to the second aspect of this Mathews factor, the Court
noted that raising the standard of proof would have both practical
and symbolic consequences. 64 The practical consequence would
be to inform the factfinder of the importance of the decision and
thus reduce the likelihood of an inappropriate termination.65 On a
symbolic level, a preponderance standard falsely reflects a societal
determination that an erroneous termination and an erroneous
failure to terminate are equal societal values, 66 when in fact there
is greater harm when an erroneous termination ensues.6 7 Thus, a
preponderance standard does not accurately reflect the relative se-
verity of these outcomes. 6 8 Again, the dissent would agree with
New York's conceptualization that these outcomes are essentially
equal.69
In its analysis of the third Mathews factor, governmental inter-
ests, the Court focused on two interests. First, it noted that the
fact that permanent neglect proceedings use rather imprecise substantive
standards. These standards leave decisions open to the subjective values of
judges, give judges unusual discretion in underweighing facts favorable to
the parents, and leave proceedings vulnerable to cultural or class bias. The
second set of factors concerns the state's superior ability to assemble a case.
In particular, the state's attorney is usually an expert in this type of litigation
and has access to public records and psychological experts. Also, since the
child is usually in the state's custody, the state can, more easily than the par-
ents, shape the events leading to a termination proceeding. The Court noted
that this disparity will be even greater in states not providing counsel for in-
digent parents. The final set of factors concerns the asymmetry in the litiga-
tion options of the two parties. In particular, parents have no double
jeopardy protection. Id. at 1399-1400.
63. Id. at 1400.
64. Id.
65. Id. The Court borrowed language from Addington to make its point. "An
elevated standard of proof in a parental rights termination proceeding would
alleviate 'the possible risk that a factfinder might decide to [deprive] an indi-
vidual based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] ...
idiosyncratic behavior."' Id. at 1400.
66. Id. at 1400.
67. "For the child, the likely consequence of an erroneous failure to terminate is
preservation of an uneasy status quo. For the natural parents, however, the
consequence of an erroneous termination is the unnecessary destruction of
their natural family." Id. at 1400-01.
68. Id. at 1401.
69. Id. at 1412-13, 1412 n.13. In balancing the interests of the child and state
against those of the parents, Justice Rehnquist wrote: "[I]t cannot be said
that either set of interests is so clearly paramount as to require that the risk
of error be allocated to one side or another." Id. at 1413 (Rehnquist, J., dis-




state had a strongparenspatriaeO interest in "preserving and pro-
moting the welfare of the child ... ."71 In this way, the State
shares the parents' interest in an accurate determination at the
factfinding stage72 since it would be a betrayal of this power to
sever the legal relationship between fit parents and their chil-
dren.73 Like the interests of the child, the state's interests only
diverge from those of the parents' interests at the dispositional
stage.74
The second government interest noted by the Court was "a
fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden
of such proceedings."7 5 From a fiscal standpoint, the Court distin-
guished Santosky from the Mathews and Lassiter decisions by em-
phasizing the relatively minimal impact that a stricter standard of
proof would have upon the proceedings.76 Also, the Santosky
Court noted that thirty-three states 77 employ a higher standard
without adverse consequences. Similarly, on the question of ad-
ministrative burden, the Court stressed that Family Court judges
70. "In the United States, the state, as a sovereign-referring to the sovereign
power of guardianship over persons under disability;.., such as minors, and
insane and incompetent persons." BLAcK's LAW DIcTioNARY 1269 (rev. 4th ed.
1968) (citations omitted).
71. Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1401.
72. Id. This language affirms that the state's goal under this power is to provide
for a permanent home for the child. The parens patriae power of the state
favors preservation of the natural family unit when the parents are fit. Id.
73. Id. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) is cited for this proposition.
74. Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1401 n.17. If the Court's analysis is to be taken at face
value, this statement is difficult to reconcile with the Court's earlier state-
ment that the factflnding stage pits the parent against the state. Perhaps the
Court is merely implying that all parties-parent, child, and state-share a
vital interest in an accurate and just determination, even in the adversary
roles occupied by the state and the parents.
75. Id. at 1401.
76. Id. "Unlike a constitutional requirement of hearings, see, e.g., Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. at 347, 96 S. Ct., at 908, or court appointed counsel, [see, e.g.,
Lassister v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981),] a stricter standard of
proof would reduce factual error without imposing substantial fiscal burdens
upon the State." Id.
77. The states requiring a clear and convincing standard by statute are: Alaska,
California, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
The states requiring a clear and convincing standard by court decision are:
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Ilinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washing-
ton, Wyoming, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands. South Dakota
has required a "clear preponderance" standard. New Hampshire and Louisi-
ana has required a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard by case and statute
respectively. The citations are collected in Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1392 n.3.
As previously noted, Nebraska requires a clear and convincing standard.
See In re Souza, 204 Neb. 503, 283 N.W.2d 48 (1979).
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were already familiar with a higher standard of proof;78 and there-
fore, its application in this setting would not create greater admin-
istrative burdens.
Thus, the Court stated: "The logical conclusion of this balanc-
ing process is that the 'fair preponderance of the evidence' stan-
dard ... violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 79 The only question left for the Court to consider
was whether to apply a clear and convincing standard or a beyond
a reasonable doubt standard. The Court decided upon the former
standard for two basic reasons. First, it was hesitant to apply the
reasonable doubt standard too broadly in noncriminal cases.8 0
Second, the Court stressed that psychiatric evidence which would
be employed in termination proceedings would not be susceptible
to proof at the higher standard.8 1 The Court distinguished the In-
dian Child Welfare Act's use of a clear and convincing standard.8 2
Thus, the Court held "that such a standard adequately conveys to
the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual
conclusions necessary to satisfy due process." 83 Of course, the
Court noted, the exact level of proof equal to or greater than this
standard is left to the states to decide.84
Apart from its differing analysis of the Mathews factor, the dis-
sent offered two arguments. First, the dissent emphasized the he-
gemony of the states in the area of family law.8 5 The dissent
pointed out that the decision would have undesirable conse-
quences in two ways. First, it would lead to the federalization of
78. Specifically, New York mandates a clear and convincing standard of proof in
termination of parental rights cases due to mental illness, retardation, or se-
vere abuse. Also, New York uses this higher standard in cases of traffic in-
fractions and contract reformations. 102 S. Ct. at 1402.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (relying on language from Addington).
82. Id. "Congress did not consider, however, the evidentiary problems that
would arise if proof beyond a reasonable doubt were required in all State-
initiated parental rights termination proceedings." Id.
83. 102 S. Ct. at 1402-03.
84. 102 S. Ct. at 1403. States have always been free to provide greater but not
lesser protections than are constitutionally mandated.
85. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent seemed to be attempting to re-
vive the notion that matters of family law should be left to the states. See
supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. But the dissent qualified its position:
This is not to say that the Court should blink at clear constitutional
violations in state statutes, but rather that in this area, of all areas,
"substantial weight must be given to the good faith judgments of the
individuals [administering a program] . . .that the procedures they





family law,86 that is, greater federal intervention in state court mat-
ters, and second, it would stifle the generatidn of creative solutions
to family law problems in state courts.87
The dissent's second major argument was that the majority
took a myopic view of New York's statutory procedure by merely
focusing on the standard of proof and not the statute in its en-
tirety.88 Taken as a whole, the dissent concluded that New York's
scheme is fundamentally fair.89 Additionally, the dissent pointed
to the factual setting of Santosky as an illustration of the exhaus-
tive character of New York's statutory scheme. 90
I. ANALYSIS OF THE SANTOSKY DECISION
A discussion of the Santosky decision begins by asking why the
Supreme Court did not mandate the reasonable doubt standard as
the constitutionally necessary burden of proof in termination of
parental rights proceedings.
Since the Court in deciding Santosky spent the greater part of
its opinion rejecting New York's "fair preponderance" standard
and only three paragraphs deciding between a clear and convinc-
ing and a reasonable doubt standard,9 ' the Court does not make its
reasoning on this question abundantly clear. When the Court did
arrive at the final question of which standard should be required, it
relied almost exclusively on language from Addington to the effect
that first, it was hesitant about extending the reasonable doubt
standard to noncriminal contexts, and second, it was concerned
with the unreliability of evidence used in termination proceed-
ings.92 Finally, as additional support for its decision, the Court
noted that a majority of states use a clear and convincing stan-
dard.93 A number of possible explanations for the Court's decision
86. 102 S. Ct. at 1404 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that by ana-
lyzing the question of an appropriate standard of proof, the Court would have
to evaluate other aspects of the states' statutory schemes; and thus, family
law would be federalized.
87. 102 S. Ct. at 1403-04 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized that
federal intrusion will stifle states' attempts to come up with "novel ap-
proaches and promising progress" to the problems of family law. Id.
88. Id. at 1405. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1408. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1402-03.
92. Id. at 1402.
93. See supra note 77. This argument appears rather vacuous on its face, since
the Court has never felt compelled to make a decision by merely tallying the
stands of the various states. In fact, if this were the case, the decision in
Lassiter would have been different since 33 states provided that indigent par-
ents are entitled to counsel Perhaps the Court's argument is really an indi-
cation of some deference being paid to states in the area of family law. The
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will be examined below. It should be noted that these rationales
are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
First, the Santosky Court's heavy reliance on language from
Addington carries the implicit assumption that termination of pa-
rental rights proceedings more closely resemble cases of civil com-
mitment than criminal trials; and therefore, a clear and convincing
standard is more appropriate. The cogency of this assumption will
be explored.
In deciding Addington, the Court began by referring to the two-
pronged test announced in In re Winship.94 In that case, the Court
held that a reasonable doubt standard was not only constitution-
ally necessary in adult criminal trials, but also in juvenile delin-
quency proceedings because both types of cases involved: (1) the
potential for the complete loss of physical liberty, and
(2) stigma.95 Interestingly, the Court in Addington concedes that
both of these elements are present in cases of civil commitment 96
but proposes that there still exist differences between civil com-
mitment and juvenile delinquency cases which justify different
standards. 97 Specifically, the Court noted that in civil commit-
ment, the state's power is not punitive, that there are opportunities
for changing erroneous commitments, and that the two proceed-
ings involve very different types of inquiry.98 Therefore, it is nec-
essary to further examine the Court's reasoning in Addington to
determine the applicability of these factors to Santosky and to de-
cide whether Santosky more closely resembles criminal cases than
Addington.
In regard to the first Winship factor, it may be argued that Add-
ington comes closer to criminal cases because of the potential loss
of physical liberty inherent in commitment. In contrast, Santosky
involves the loss of a different type of fundamental liberty interest,
namely the loss of one's children. The Court's distinction between
Court wrote: "Although Congress found a 'beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard proper in one type of parental rights termination case I (Indian Child
Welfare Act)], another legislative body might well conclude that an reason-
able doubt standard would erect an unreasonable barrier to state efforts to
free permanently neglected children for adoption." 102 S. Ct. at 1402. Also,
the Court noted, "that determination of the precise burden equal to or greater
than that standard is a matter of state law properly left to state legislatures
and state courts." Id. at 1403. Although the Court seemed to reject the dis-
sent's argument that states should be the sole arbiters of family law issues, it
did seem to accept the argument that some deference be paid the state's deci-
sions, at least when those decisions accord with the Court's philosophy.
94. See supra note 45.
95. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).





these two types of interests was made clear in Lassiter where the
Court noted that an indigent's right to appointed counsel exists
only where the litigant may lose physical liberty if he or she is
found guilty.99
Thus, as a litigant's interest in personal liberty diminishes so
does his or her right to appointed counsel.OO Therefore, the Court
balanced its analysis of the Mathews factors on the question of ap-
pointed counsel against a presumption disfavoring appointed
counsel in noncriminal cases.1 01 The dissenters in Lassiter ques-
tioned the soundness of this distinction.10 2 In fact, Justice Stevens
suggested that the loss of one's children may in fact be more griev-
ous than the loss of physical liberty.' 03 Even the dissent in
Santosky noted: "Few consequences of judicial action are so grave
as the severance of family ties. Even the convict committed to
prison and thereby deprived of his physical liberty often retains
the love and support of family members."' 04 Thus, a major stum-
bling block to the use of a reasonable doubt standard in termina-
tion proceedings is the fact that no loss of physical liberty is
involved. It is understandable why the Court, having rejected the
attempt in Addington to import the reasonable doubt standard,
99. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
100. Id.
101. The Santosky Court distinguished Lassiter on this point, noting that there is
no presumption as to the correct standard of proof against which the Ma-
thews factors would be balanced.
102. "By emphasizing the value of physical liberty to the exclusion of all other
fundamental interests, the Court today grants an unnecessary and burden-
some new layer of analysis on its traditional three-factor balancing test."
Lassiter, 425 U.S. at 659 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 659-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. Santosky 102 S. Ct. at 1412 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Theoretically, it is difficult to attempt to balance the loss of physical lib-
erty and the loss of one's children. Empirically, it may be possible to meas-
ure the impact of both types of losses in order to attain a better
understanding of the gravity of each. Another way of comparing these two
types of deprivation might be in terms of permanency. As the Court in
Santosky pointed out, the extent of due process protection must be evaluated
according to the nature of the interest affected and the permanency of the
loss. Except in extreme cases, a criminal conviction does not result in the
permanent deprivation of physical freedom. However, a parental termination
decision does result in an irreversible deprivation of parents' liberty interest
in their children. See infra note 113.
Finally, the values of these two interests might be compared on an "ex-
haustiveness" dimension. Thus, imprisonment is usually totally encompass-
ing for the specified period, while termination of parental rights does not
preclude parents from having other children-as the facts in Santosky attest.
But, one might question whether termination would have a chilling effect on




would be even more hesitant to do so in Santosky which did not
involve a loss of physical liberty.
Regarding the second Winship factor, stigma, it appears that
both Addington and Santosky resemble criminal cases. The Add-
ington court noted that stigma often accompanys commitment. In
the same way, stigma would clearly result from a determination by
a court that parents were unfit to care for their children. The liter-
ature on perceptions of child abusers might be supportive of this
assertion. Arguably, then, Santosky meets both prongs of the Win-
ship test. However, Addington instructs that the two prongs of
Winship are necessary, but not sufficient conditions.
Perhaps, then, the Winship decision rested not only on these
two points of similarity between criminal cases and juvenile delin-
quency proceedings but on other similarities. 0 5 The Court in Add-
ington stressed the importance of other factors.10 6 First, it noted
that the State's power in cases of civil commitment was not puni-
tive as in criminal cases and presumably juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings. Assuming arguendo that the Court was correct in
Addington, it is possible to argue that the termination of parental
rights is indeed punitive. For instance, the dissent in Lassiter
states: "It is hardly surprising that this forced dissolution of the
parent-child relationship has been recognized as a punitive sanc-
tion by courts, Congress, and commentators."107 Similarly, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court stated: "The loss of one's children
can be viewed as a sanction more severe than imprisonment." 108
In this sense, Santosky may be closer to criminal cases than
Addington.109
105. However, while the Court did not equate juvenile delinquency proceedings
with criminal trials per se, it should be remembered that in In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967), decided three years before Winship, the Court similarly held
that a juvenile is entitled to many of the same protections accorded an adult
criminal defendant. Specifically, these protections included notice of
charges, right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination of wit-
nesses, and the right against self-incrimination. Thus, the Court had already
gone a long way toward equating these proceedings. Although later, in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court seemed to back
down by not mandating trial by jury in juvenile cases, the incredible similar-
ity between criminal cases and juvenile proceedings cannot be escaped.
106. In stressing these other considerations, the Addington Court sought in par-
ticular to distinguish Winship. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.
107. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 39 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). See id. at 29-30 nn. 4-6 for citations to the punitive nature of the
termination of the parent-child relationship.
108. State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 716, 393 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1978). In this case, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court required that a reasonable doubt standard
be used in parental termination cases. New Hampshire and Louisiana are
the only two states requiring this higher standard. See supra note 77.
109. One caveat to this argument must be noted. In criminal cases, the state exer-
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Another factor stressed in Addington was that there are oppor-
tunities to change erroneous commitments. In contrast, the major-
ity in Santosky stressed the permanence and irreversibility of a
termination decision once it has become final. Specifically, the
Court mentioned both juvenile delinquency and civil commitment
cases as examples of "reversible official actions"" 0 at least to a de-
gree. Conversely, the Court wrote of terminations: "Few forms of
state action are both so severe and so irreversible.""'
Finally, the Addington Court stressed that criminal and civil
commitment cases involved two very different types of inquiry.
Criminal adjudications as well as juvenile cases usually require
relatively straightforward factual determinations while civil com-
mitment decisions rest on interpretations of the meaning of facts.
More specifically, the Addington Court pointed to the general un-
reliability of psychiatric evidence used in civil commitment deter-
minations and that this evidence is usually not susceptible to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.112 It is interesting to note that the
Santosky majority adopted this argument: "Like civil commitment
hearings, termination proceedings often require the factfinder to
evaluate medical and psychiatric testimony, and to decide issues
difficult to prove to a level of absolute certainty, such as lack of
parental motive, absence of affection between parent and child,
and failure of parental foresight and progress."" 3
Two objections could be raised to this assertion. First, in civil
commitment the standard is whether an individual is mentally ill
and dangerous to self or others. The question of mental illness is a
notoriously difficult one to answer. Also, the dangerousness ques-
tion requires a mental health expert to make a prediction of future
conduct, which as demonstrated by the relevant literature, is very
cises its police power. In civil commitment the state is exercising both a
parenspatriae power, in taking care of individuals who cannot care for them-
selves, and a police power in protecting society. In termination cases, the
state is acting merely under a parens patriae power, although a parent may
later be subject to criminal liability. In this sense, then, Addington, is closer
to the criminal context.
110. Santosky 102 S. Ct. at 1397 (emphasis original).
111. Id.
112. Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis,
there is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and
likely to be dangerous .... The subtleties and nuances of psychiat-
ric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most
situations.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
113. Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1402. Also, the Court noted, the Indian Child Welfare
Act used a higher standard of proof, but dismissed this precedent on the
ground that Congress had not considered the attendant evidentiary problems
raised by a higher standard of proof.
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hard."4 In contrast, termination of parental rights proceedings
might be more akin to criminal proceedings in which the factfinder
is instructed by statutory standards as to what elements must be
present before a conviction takes place. For example, in New
York, the factfinder must decide whether a parent has substan-
tially failed to plan for the future of his or her child and whether
the state has made diligent efforts to reunite the family. These are
factual issues relating to past events which are susceptible to dem-
onstration through the use of ordinary evidence. It is true that
other issues, including parental neglect and absence of affection
between parent and child, might require expert testimony, but
these issues may not be so unlike the issue of insanity in criminal
cases as to justify a distinction.
Second, if parental termination standards really are so ambigu-
ous, then this may be a two-edged sword. That is, a higher stan-
dard of proof may be necessary to combat the potential abuses of
this standard. This is precisely the argument that the majority in
Santosky advanced for not using a preponderance standard" 5 and
the dissent in Lassiter n 6 used to support an indigent parent's right
to counsel.
Another argument which was not raised in Addington, but
played an important part in Winship and Gault, concerned the ef-
fect of the additional protections on the nature of the proceeding.
Thus, it was argued in both Winship and Gault that incorporating
various procedural protections into the juvenile system would de-
stroy the ameliorative and beneficial nature of the proceedings.
The Winship Court rejected these arguments by saying that a civil
label and good intentions cannot justify the lack of due process." 7
This argument also appeared in Lassiter where the Court wrote
that the state sometimes has an interest in informal proceedings.
The dissent, on the other hand, likened parental termination to
criminal trials." 8 The Court in Santosky adopted this latter posi-
tion when it wrote that termination proceedings "bear many of the
indicia of a criminal trial."119 Since the proceedings are already
formal and adversarial, the use of a higher standard of proof would
not make the proceedings less beneficial. In the same vein, it
should be noted, as the Court in Santosky did, that in both types of
114. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAuF. L. REV. 693 (1974); Morse, Crazy Behavior,
Moras, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV.
527 (1978).
115. Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1399. See also supra note 62.
116. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 35 (1981).
117. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
118. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 35 (1981).
119. Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1398.
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cases, the state is pitted directly against the individual.120
In addition to the preceeding examination of the Court's ration-
ale in rejecting the reasonable doubt standard in Santosky, there
are at least three other possible explanations the Court's decision.
First, the Court might simply be concerned that requiring a rea-
sonable doubt standard in the context of parental termination pro-
ceedings would not only require the Court to decide (or redecide
as in Lassiter)12 1 whether other "criminal" protections are neces-
sary in that context, 22 but would also open the floodgates to the
use of the reasonable doubt standard in other contexts such as
civil commitment.123 Thus, perhaps the Court is simply exercising
a type of self-restraint.
A second explanation of Santosky might be the Court's quiet
solicitude for the interests of the child. Perhaps the Court is bal-
ancing not only the interests of the parents and the state, but also
the child's interest in a "stable, loving homelife."124 While the ma-
jority eschewed this position 25 and the dissent advocated it, this
silent interest of the child may in fact present a very real hurdle to
equating termination of parental rights with criminal trials where
there are only two interested parties, the state and the defendant.
Finally, on a jurisprudential level, Santosky might simply have
been a compromise, middle-of-the-road decision like Lassiter. In
Lassiter, the court had a choice between not requiring and requir-
ing counsel for indigent parents. The Court avoided either ex-
treme and chose a moderate case-by-case approach. Santosky
follows this trend nicely.126 Given the choice of three standards,
the Court chose the middle ground.12 7 In both cases, the Court
scrupulously avoided equating termination proceedings with
either "extreme" criminal trial or civil case. In adopting this mod-
120. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
121. It is likely, then, that because of the similarities between the cases, Lassiter
would have to be redecided had there been a different decision in Santosky.
122. This has been the case in juvenile law since Gault.
123. It is still arguable, that Addington can be successfully distinguished from
Santosky and that a reasonable doubt standard could be used in the latter
without being used in the former. See text accompanying notes 92-122.
124. Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1412 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1398.
126. The major problem, in reconciling Santosky and Lassiter, concerns the possi-
ble tension between the rights guaranteed in the respective decisions. It is
questionable whether elevating the standard of proof from a fair preponder-
ance to clear and convincing will be of much help to uncounselled indigent
parents. The function of counsel is to get evidence before the Court, while
the function of a standard of proof is to instruct the factfinder how to weigh
that evidence. Thus, indigent parents may be simply unable to amass the
relevant evidence without the assistance of counsel and the effect of a higher
standard will be impaired.
127. Santosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1396.
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erate position, the Court might be saying that the liberty interest
of a parent in his or her offspring is one of substantial importance
and worthy of protection, but not as substantial as the loss of phys-
ical liberty. The analogies between Lassiter and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli]28 and between Santosky and Addington are not acci-
dental. In each case, the individual is given some but not all the
rights of a criminal defendant.
Perhaps one final speculation is permissible. Given the relative
recency of the status of family rights as fundamental, the Court
might actually be heading in the direction of elevating these rights
to the status accorded physical liberty, but is presently in a state of
transition.129
IV. CONCLUSION
With the increasing recognition of the fundamental nature of
"family rights," the Supreme Court has been confronted with a va-
riety of cases, asking it to delineate the scope of due process pro-
tections necessitated by the fundamental nature of the right.
Santosky, and for that matter, Lassiter, are unremarkable in this
regard. However, they may be instructive as to the type of middle-
of-the-road stance the Court is presently taking in matters con-
cerning the family.
Patricia J. Falk '83
128. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). Gagnon held that a probationer did not have a right to
counsel per se in probation revocation proceedings but that it would be de-
cided on a case-by-case basis. The rationale for the decision was that proba-
tioners do not enjoy the same rights as criminal defendants before
conviction. For a fuller analysis of this point, see Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32.
129. The Lassiter dissent's analysis of the progression from Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942), which held that a criminal defendant's right to counsel was
not a fundamental right, to Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which
reversed Betts, is instructive. Also, it should be remembered that Winship,
which mandated a reasonable doubt standard, was not decided until 1970.
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